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INSURANCE LAW
by
Royal H. Brin, Jr.*
I.

AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

Uninsured Motorist Coverage. Development of the Texas law in this field

continued apace during this reporting period. As anticipated in the immediately preceding Survey,' an answer has now been provided to the question
whether stacking of uninsured motorist coverage in Texas is permissible. In
two cases consolidated for consideration because of their presentation of a
common question of law, Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Tucker and
Dhane v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., 2 the Texas Supreme Court

reversed and remanded a decision by the Houston court of civil appeals which
held stacking the policy limits of uninsured motorist coverage permissible
where necessary to satisfy the insured's damages and, in the companion case,
affirmed a contrary holding on the same issue by the Waco court of civil appeals. The stipulated facts in Tucker were as follows: the insurer issued
an automobile insurance policy on two vehicles owned by the insured; the
policy limits were $10,000 for each person injured and $20,000 for each accident; a four-dollar premium was assessed for the vehicle designated as car
one and a three-dollar premium was assessed for the vehicle designated as car
two. The insured's damages arising out of a collision proximately caused by
the negligence of an uninsured motorist were $15,000. Judgment for the insured in that amount less amounts previously paid by the insurer was
rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The
facts stipulated in Dhane involved a single automobile insurance policy on
three cars owned by the insured. The policy provided both for medical payments coverage with a stated limit of $2,000 for each injured person and
uninsured motorist coverage, styled in the policy as "family protection
coverage," with stated limits of $10,000 for each injured person and
$20,000 for each accident. Damages in Dhane exclusive of medical
expenses were stipulated to exceed $36,000.
The insureds in Tucker argued that the three-dollar premium provided consideration for the additional risk exposure created by stacking. Responding
to this contention, the court stated that this additional premium provided consideration for protection afforded the named insured and relatives while riding in or being struck by the additional insured vehicle and also to third parties while occupying the additional insured vehicle. So interpreted, the stack*
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ing of coverages on a single, multi-car automobile liability policy, absent additional consideration specifically intended to provide such coverage, is not permissible.
The court, however, denied the insurer's contention in Dhane that the medical payments coverage should not be stacked. Instead it agreed with the
authorities holding stacking to be permissible with respect to this kind of insurance protection where necessary to compensate the insured's medical expenses. The insurer's argument that amounts payable under the medical
payments coverage of the policy should be credited against the amount recoverable under the uninsured motorist coverage was likewise rejected on the
ground that the Texas Uninsured Motorist Statute 3 provided irreducible minimum coverage, so that the policy provision for such reduction was ineffective.
Whether an underinsured motorist constitutes an uninsured motorist within
the meaning of the Texas Safety Responsibility Act 4 was settled during this
reporting period. In Kemp v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.5 the Texas Supreme
Court faced a fact situation involving a number of persons who were injured
and killed through the negligence of a motorist who carried the minimum liability coverage required by the Texas Safety Responsibility Act. In a
severed non-jury case, the trial court awarded each plaintiff damages in excess of $10,000. The insurer tendered the $20,000 policy limit to the court
registry where that sum was divided and disbursed to the injured parties.
Each individual plaintiff received less than $10,000. As a result, plaintiffs
sought recovery for the difference between the amount recovered and the
$10,000 coverage provided by the uninsured motorist provisions of their own
policies. Since the tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage was apportioned
among several claimants, plaintiffs argued that the tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist as defined by the Texas Uninsured Motorist Statute. Plaintiffs bolstered this argument by contending that the Uninsured Motorist Statute constituted an integral part of their policies and that any judicial definition
of uninsured motorist limiting its protection would be in derogation of the
statute. The court of civil appeals affirmed the summary judgment granted
the insurer 'by the trial court, holding that the statutory definition of uninsured
motorist was unambiguous and that "uninsured" did not mean "underinsured." 6 In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
court of civil appeals ruling.
3. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Supp. 1974). This statute provides in part:
(1) No automobile liability insurance . . . covering liability arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto, in the limits described in the Texas Motor Vehicle
Safety-Responsibility Act, under provisions prescribed by the Board, for

the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting theref rom.

4. TEx.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

art. 6701h (Supp. 1974).

5. 512 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1974).
6. 504 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), aff'd per curiam, 512 S.W.2d

688 (Tex. 1974).
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A growing body of decisions further settled the law applicable to uninsured
motorist coverage. Where suit was brought under the uninsured motorist
provision of plaintiff's policy, the Texas Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, held that the four-year statute of limitations applied both to a claim
for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff and to a claim for the death
of the plaintiff's daughter arising out of the same accident. 7 In a separate
case the court affirmed the decision of the Beaumont court of civil appeals
that the "other insurance" clause does not bar recovery from one's own insurance carrier for damages sustained while driving his employer's vehicle,
despite prior settlement with the employer's insurance carrier of an uninsured
motorist claim arising out of the same accident.8
Further definition of the term "uninsured motorist" issued from the
Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals in the case of Garcia
v. Travelers Insurance Co.9 There, the plaintiff requested a rather novel
definition for uninsured motorist, asking the court to include a tortfeasor within the definition of "uninsured motorist" when the tortfeasor fails to cooperate
with his insurance company after a collision and his insurance company, as a
result thereof, refuses to negotiate the injured party's claim. In Garciathe tortfeasor disappeared after the accident. Since his insurance company was unable to determine if it had a policy defense, it refused to negotiate plaintiff's
claim. After reviewing two New York cases, 10 the court refused to hold that
an insurer has an absolute right to avoid deciding whether a policyholder
has coverage after an accident. Under the facts before it, however, the court
held that coverage was not denied because of mere inactivity of the insurer.
Policy provisions requiring immediate notice by an insured and forwarding
of suit papers of an uninsured motorist claim were sustained in Milton v. Preferred Risk Insurance Co." The court held that strict compliance with all
conditions precedent of an insurance policy is necessary for imposition of liability upon the insurer and that this applies with respect to uninsured motorist coverage. The policy here specifically provided with respect to uninsured
motorist coverage that if the insured should bring action against the uninsured
motorist, a copy of the papers should be forwarded "immediately" to the insurer. It was recognized that neither the required notice of the accident nor
the forwarding of the suit papers need take place until the insured has a reasonable basis for belief that the offending motorist is or has become uninsured. However, the jury here had found that plaintiff failed to forward suit
papers immediately after she realized she had a claim under the uninsured
motorist coverage, and the court held that this finding was supported by the
evidence and barred recovery. The record indicated that in January 1972
the insured had reason to suspect that the driver of the other vehicle was
7. Franco v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1974).
8. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 514 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1974).
9. 501 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
10. These cases were Gonzales v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 48
Misc. 2d 958, 266 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1966), and Application of DiStefano, 34 Misc.
2d 68, 228 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
11. 511 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ fef'd n.r.e.).
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an uninsured motorist but did not forward the suit papers to her insurers until
March 23, and April 3, 1972.
Causation. Gallup v. St. Paul Insurance Co.1 2 extended the holding in
Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kahn'3 that the policy phrase "be-

ing struck by" did not include riding a bike into the back of a legally parked
vehicle. In Gallup a majority of the Texas Supreme Court affirmed a court
of civil appeal's assessment that Kahn provided controlling precedent in a case
where a motorcyclist ran into the rear of a stopped vehicle waiting to turn
left. Interpreting the language "being struck by" to require an actor and a
recipient of that action, recovery was denied. The court refused to treat "being struck by" as the equivalent of "collide." Three members of the court
vigorously dissented, arguing that the rule adopted in Gallup mandated consideration of the relative positions and vectors of the vehicles involved in an
accident. Deploring the majority's restrictive interpretation of the policy
phrase, the dissenters would have extended coverage.
"No Action" Clause. In First National Indemnity Co. v. Mercado14 an in-

surer issued an automobile liability policy to one Richard Evilsizer, who
thereafter collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger. The insurer denied coverage and refused defense of the insured. Plaintiff obtained
a $4,000 judgment against Evilsizer and then sought to enforce the judgment
against the insurer. Sitting without a jury, the trial court rendered judgment,
affirmed by the court of civil appeals, for Mercado.
The insurer contended that the prior judgment against its insured had not
been determined by "actual trial" as required by the "no action" clause in
its policy but rather had been the result of a collusive suit. The stipulated
facts relied upon by appellant were: (1) Mercado's claim arose when a car
in which he was riding backed out of a private driveway into the side of Evilsizer's truck; (2) Mercado was the only witness at the prior trial; (3) by
agreement medical records were read into evidence; (4) Evilsizer's attorney
would testify, if called upon to do so, that he put no defense witness on,
agreed to introduction into evidence of the medical records and conducted
the defense of Evilsizer in the manner stipulated because of a prior agreement with Mercado that Evilsizer would not suffer levy of execution for
any judgment rendered therein. Responding -to the insurer's contention
that the prior suit had been collusive, -the court affirmed on the basis
that the "no action" clause was waived by its refusal to defend its insured.
The court, however, failed to rule whether the earlier suit had been an
''actual trial."
Estoppel. Estoppel figured prominently in two cases rendered during this reporting period, Green v. Helmcamp Insurance Agency' 5 and Radoff v. Utica
12.
13.
14.
15.

515 S.W.2d
359 S.W.2d
511 S.W.2d
499 S.W.2d

249
892
354
730

(Tex.
(Tex.
(Tex.
(Tex.

1974).
1962).
Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Mutual Insurance Co.16 In Green, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment
against a Mr. Prudhomme for personal injuries received in a vehicular collision. Prudhomme assigned to plaintiffs any cause of action he had against
his insurance agent and -they subsequently brought suit against the agent for
failure to provide insurance coverage to Prudhomme. The trial court entered
judgment for the agent on the basis of the two-year statute of limitation, but
on appeal judgment was reversed and rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
The suit against the insurance agent was brought more than four years after
the accident but less than two years after the default judgment against Prudhomme. It was held that since Prudhomme suffered no damage until the
entry of judgment against him, his cause of action for the negligent failure
of the insurance agent to provide coverage arose only when that judgment
was taken, and consequently, the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court further held that the agent was liable on the basis of
promissory estoppel, because the jury had found that prior to the expiration
of Prudhomme's insurance policy on April 17, 1967, the agent represented
to him that his truck would be covered through May 13, 1966, that Prudhomme relied on such representation and therefore did not obtain liability
from another source and was not negligent in doing so, and that these facts
were the proximate cause for Prudhomme's not having coverage on his truck
on the date of the accident. While there was no contract between Prudhomme and the agent to obtain insurance, promissory estoppel prevented
7
the agent from denying the enforceability of his promise to provide it.'
In Radoff, since the agent's representation was not false, estoppel proved
unavailing. The insurance policy examined in Radoff contained an exclusionary clause which limited coverage to accidents occurring while the named
insured, a driver under twenty-five with a learner's permit, was accompanied
by one of his parents. A transmittal letter sent by the agent to the insured's
father contained the following statement: "He [insured's son] still will have
coverage only if you are or Mrs. Radoff are in the car with him while he
is driving with a learner's permit.""' Shortly after the insured's son obtained
his regular driver's license, he was involved in an accident caused by his negligence.
Plaintiff argued that the insurance company was estopped from relying
upon the exclusionary endorsement attached to the policy by the representation of their agent contained in the transmittal letter. The trial court found
that there was no misrepresentation of the limits of coverage either by the
insurer or its agent, but rather that the plaintiffs misinterpreted the import
of the statement in the transmittal letter. The appellate court agreed with
the trial court's judgment, adding that the transmittal letter constituted
nothing more than an unsolicited comment concerning the policy.
16. 510 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. The opinion noted in this connection that the Texas Supreme Court in Wheeler

v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965), cited with approval the RESTATEMENT
TRAcTs § 90 (1932) setting forth the basis for promissory estoppel.

18. 510 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

OF

CON-
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Effect of Insurance Binder. In Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Chrysler Credit Corp.1 9 the Texas Supreme Court reiterated the rule that
the burden rests upon the insured to plead and prove the existence and terms
of an insurance contract. Stating that this rule applied equally to insurance
binders, the court recognized that binders may expire by their own terms and
held that where an alleged insured fails to plead or prove that the binder
was in effect at the time of loss, judgment for the insured is erroneous.
Vehicular Definition. While the court's statements in Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Buck's Tri-State IrrigationEngine Co. 20 may not have been absolutely required by the facts presented, the court held that a dragster was
not an automobile within the terms of an exclusionary provision in a property
insurance policy. The test applied by the court required inquiry into whether
the vehicle was designed for use on a public street or highway. The facts
that the vehicle had no radiator or reverse gear, used a parachute for a brake,
required a special type of fuel, and could travel only about a quarter of a
mile, proved decisive in the determination that it was not an automobile.
Medical Malpractice. The perils of voluntarily submitting to treatment for
alcoholism were presented in a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, Big Town
Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Reserve Insurance Co.21 In this case, the patient
voluntarily entered the nursing home for treatment. For undisclosed reasons,
he then attempted to leave the premises six times during the following two
months. On five occasions, the staff at the nursing home observed and restrained him, but on the sixth try he succeeded. The patient, annoyed by
the nursing home's enthusiastic restraints, filed suit for false imprisonment.
Nursing Homes' insurer denied coverage and refused to defend the insured.
Nursing Homes undertook its own defense, ultimately suffering a $13,000
judgment.
Thereafter, Nursing Homes sued its insurer, alleging that the basis for the
prior suit involved a risk covered by its malpractice insurance. The professional liability endorsement in its policy provided in pertinent part:
It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by the policy under the
liability coverages also applies :to damages because of injury, including
death, sustained by any person and arising out of malpractice as defined
herein committed during the policy period . . . I. 'malpractice' means
malpractice, error or mistake (a) in rendering or failing to render to
such person, or to the person inflicting the injury, medical, surgical,
dental or nursing care .... 2
Nursing Homes contended that its treatment of the patient amounted to
"error or mistake" in the rendition of nursing care in that it had mistaken
the patient's irritation for irrationality and that its action was therefore within
the policy's coverage. The federal district court rejected this contention,
characterizing the restraints imposed on the patient by Nursing Homes as the
19.
20.
21.
22.

501 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
500 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
492 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 524-25.
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result of an administrative decision and mechanical action on the part of its
employees rather than the product of the professional judgment covered by
the malpractice policy. In reversing this decision the Fifth Circuit applied
a test inquiring whether the treatment and restraint involved the exercise of
trained nursing judgment in response to established medical policy. The
court noted that there was some confusion as to who ordered the patient restrained. However, the court decided that the fact that the hospital had a
general policy requiring nurses to restrain irrational patients, coupled with the
findings of the trial court, indicated that the nurse's action in restraining the
patient was the result of trained nursing judgment. The court concluded that
the nurse had simply misinterpreted the patient's condition and that such
error was of the kind covered by a malpractice endorsement.
II.

LIFE, HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Credit Life Insurance. Widows fared poorly in two suits brought upon credit
life insurance policies. In Hocutt v. Prudential Insurance Co.23 the appellant's late husband had incurred indebtedness exceeding $10,000 in purchasing farm equipment from two separate dealers. Two credit life insurance
policies had been issued to the husband by the same insurer and each policy
contained a $10,000 limitation clause. Affirming judgment non obstante veredicto for the insurer, the court of civil appeals held that the limitation clause
applied to all indebtedness incurred by the insured irrespective of the num24
ber of dealers involved. In Gideon v. Service Life & Casualty Insurance Co.
the court of civil appeals ruled that the pilot of a private plane was "riding
in" an aircraft at the time of his death within the meaning of an exclusionary
clause in his credit life policy.
25
Accidental Death. In National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Franklin

the basic benefits under the life insurance policies had been paid and the
suit concerned only the additional accidental death benefits. The insured
had been known to be subject to mild epileptic seizures. He was found dead
in his apartment lying over the edge of the bathtub with his head and one
arm within the tub, with -the water running. The autopsy revealed that his
lungs and cranial cavity were filled with water, and the examiner's report
concluded that he had died by drowning. The report also indicated that
the insured may have suffered a seizure at or near the time of death, since
his tongue was protruding and had been bitten, the veins in his neck were
distended, and his head was in a contorted position.
23. 501 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
24. 510 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).

25. 506 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See also Key Life Ins. Co. v. Murray, 502 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the latter case it was held that uncontradicted evidence that the
insured's body was found with his eyes open, lying on his back, with no marks on him
and his clothes not torn, and in view of his admittedly diseased heart and the absence
of visible bodily injury as distinguished from the inference of over-exertion, the life insurer was not liable for accidental death benefits. The dissent took the position that
while the evidence was sufficient to support a judgment for the plaintiff, there was some
evidence of accidental death and the case should be remanded rather than rendered.
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The policy provided for accidental death benefits if death were to result
"directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries effected
solely through external, violent and accidental means . . ; and provided further that no such death benefit shall be payable if death (i) results from
or is contributed to by any disease or mental infirmity .... -26 The jury
found the death to be accidental and on appeal it was held that the verdict
that the insured died solely by accidental means was supported by the evidence. The court reasoned that although an epileptic seizure may have
caused the decedent to fall into the tub, the seizure was at most a remote
cause rather than a proximate cause of death so that the policy exclusion was
inapplicable.
Occasionally problems arise in determining whether an insured's death
resulted from a compensable accident or suicide. In one such case, Reliable
Life Insurance Co. v. Torres,27 a trial court judgment of accidental death
from participation in a game of Russian roulette was reversed and remanded
for submission upon proper special issues. The evidence at trial had shown
that the deceased was drunk and immediately before the shooting had
announced that he wanted to play Russian roulette. The witnesses testified
that they heard the fatal gunshot but that none of them saw the deceased
at the moment of the shooting. The jury had found that the deceased did
not shoot himself while playing Russian roulette, but the court had not submitted the plaintiff's requested issue as to whether the death was from accidental injury. On appeal the Austin court of civil appeals stated that while
this finding established that the insured's death did not come within the policy
exclusion for suicide, it did not discharge plaintiff's burden of establishing
defendant's liability by showing that the death resulted from accidental bodily
injury. Consequently, a new trial was ordered in which the tendered special
issue would be submitted. One justice dissented on the ground that if suicide
were eliminated only the possibility of accidental death remained, and that
the one issue submitted in that connection was sufficient for determination
of the case.
Insolvency Proceedings. In this reporting period it was held that payments
made under a reinsurance agreement between one insurance company and
a second insolvent insurance company placed in permanent receivership must
28
be paid to the receiver for distribution and not directly to the injured party.
Additionally, a law firm which had incurred unpaid legal expenses prior to
the placement into permanent receivership of the insurance company it
represented must be placed in the class of general unsecured creditors.2 9 The
26. 506 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
27. 509 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. McFarling v. Mayfield, 510 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). Justice Keith, concurring, noted that plaintiff's preferential rights were
limited to those enumerated in Tax. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-B, § 5 (Supp. '1975).
510 S.W.2d at 111.
29. Kelly, Walker & Liles v. McFarling, 509 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1974, no writ).
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fact that the law firm had been employed to defend suits under the terms
did
of automobile liability policies issued by the insolvent insurance company 30
Act.
Priorities
Claimants'
Loss
the
of
protection
the
of
not justify extension
Causation. Whether pre-existing conditions vitiate the "direct causation"
clause of life, health, and accident insurance policies continues to create
troublesome evidentiary issues. In Lord v. Insurance Co. of North America3 ' the insurer successfully maintained that its insured's disability from a

compression fracture of the lumbar vertebra was due in whole or in part to
various pre-existing afflictions, including heart failure, cirrhosis of the liver,
diabetes, and arteriosclerosis. In Bohon v. Travelers Insurance Co.3 2 the insured secured a reversal and remand from a take-nothing judgment non obstante veredicto rendered by the trial court upon facts similar to Lord.
Bohon, however, raised the question of whether an insurer's check tendered
to the insured constituted an admission of liability under the policy. The
appellate court indicated that, in the absence of this additional factor, it
would have affirmed the trial court judgment. The Bohon court interpreted
causes" to require
the policy words "directly and independently of all other
33
proof that the accident was the "sole" or "only" cause.
Definition. In Mertes v. California-Western States Life Insurance
Hospital
Co.3 4 the insured sought recovery under a group hospitalization policy for
psychiatric treatment administered to his daughter. The insurer denied
coverage on the ground that the policy provided compensation only for
hospital treatment and the center where the daughter was treated did not constitute a hospital within the policy definition. The policy defined "hospital" as
an institution which (1) is primarily engaged in providing-for compensation from its patients and on an inpatient basis--diagnostic and
therapeutic facilities for the surgical and medical diagnosis, treatment,
and care of injured and sick individuals by or under the supervision
of a staff of doctors, (2) continuously provides 24 hours a day
service by Registered Nurses, and (3) is not a place for rest, a place
for the aged, a place for drug 3saddicts, a place for alcoholics, a nursing
home, or convalescent hospital.
Interpreting this policy definition to require facilities for surgical treatment
at the hospital itself, the Waco court of civil appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that a contractual arrangement between the treatment center and a
30. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-B (Supp. 1975).

Section 3 of the Act pro-

vides:

As used in this Article, loss claim is the claim of an insured, a third party
beneficiary, or any other person entitled thereto, under a contract of insurance or indemnification, for a loss arising within the terms of coverage
provided in a contract of insurance or indemnification for an amount
within the express limits of such insurance policy, but excluding a claim
for unearned premium.
31. 513 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. 509 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
33. Id. at 907.
34. 511 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).

35. Id. at 610.
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nearby general hospital satisfied this requirement.
insurer's denial of coverage.

The court thus sustained

Fraudulent Representations. Denial of liability by insurers on the basis of
fraudulent representations by policyholders occurred frequently during this
reporting period. Of the four reported cases, the insurer avoided liability in
three; the fourth case reversed and remanded a summary judgment for the
insurer.
As of this writing, writ has been granted in 'ohnson v. PrudentialInsurance
Co. of America,3 6 in which suit was brought for recovery pursuant to
insurance policies issued on the life of the plaintiff's deceased wife. A jury
found that in applying for her policy the insured had willfully omitted information of her treatment for cancer. Plaintiff raised the policy's "incontestability" clause in an effort to avoid the effect of this finding. This argument
failed as the court held that a contractual distinction existed between the
incontestability clause applicable to the group policy under which plaintiff's
policy was issued and that applicable to the individual policies.
In Haney v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. 37 the court stated that
jury findings of intent to deceive remain important elements of the material
misrepresentation defense. Finding the distinction between representations
and warranties unavailing, the federal courts likewise recognized the importance of a finding of intent to deceive. 88 The only insured enjoying any
success persuaded the appellate court that a fact issue, whether notice of refusal to be bound by the policy was given within ninety days of discovery
of a material misrepresentation, precluded summary judgment.3 9
III.

FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE

Land and Buildings. There were only three noteworthy decisions in this area
during the survey period. The first concerned the effect of a title failure
on the provision for proportionate payment in a title insurance policy. In
CommercialStandard Insurance Co. v. Fondren40 the Beaumont court of civil
appeals reiterated a principle established by the Texas Supreme Court in
1962,'41 that where title to an undivided interest in land fails, the title
insurance policy provision for proportionate payment is inapplicable.
Eulich v. Home Indemnity Co. 42 involved a judicial interpretation of an
insurance policy's exclusionary clause. Plaintiff's building had collapsed
because the contractor had installed a steel member whose strength was less
than that required by contract. In a suit by the building owner against the
contractor's insurer, the Dallas court of civil appeals held that a provision in
the insurance contract excluding liability coverage for the building when the
36. 506 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ granted).

37. 505 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Eagle, 484 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. Sanders v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 510 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
40. 509 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ).
41. Shaver v. National Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1962).
42. 503 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
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building contractor fails to follow specifications precludes judgment against
the contractor's insurer. 43 Further, an exclusionary clause may not be disregarded unless the allcged resulting duplication of coverage, accompanied by
payment of added premium, is certain and complete.
Finally, in a Waco court of civil appeals case, Texas Pacific Indemnity Co.
v. Building Materials Distributors, Inc.,44 the lessee-occupant of a building
suffered damage to his property stored therein following a windstorm. The
lessee originally sued the owner, then added the insurer as a party defendant,
later dismissing suit as to the owner. Defendant insurance company asserted
as a defense the impairment of its subrogation rights, due to the dismissal
of suit against the owner. The court held that the defense fails where the
jury findings support the claim that the windstorm was the sole proximate
cause of the damage.

43. The pertinent provision excluded liability for "property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work, or out of any
materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith." Id. at 848.
44. 508 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ.-App.-Waco 1974, writ refrd n.r.e.).

